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NOTE




Drug trafficking is an international problem of devastating propor-
tions. 1 After years of failed efforts to curb either supply or demand, inter-
national drug enforcement authorities have determined that the best way
to cripple the $300 billion drug industry is to attack the drug traffickers'
profit motive.2 Without the ability to transfer and disguise their enor-
mous gains, drug cartels could operate only at a small fraction of current
levels. 3 In order to restrict this illicit activity, the international commu-
1. Summit Economic Declaration, Kyodo News Service, 1 52 (July 17, 1989) (issued by the Group
of Seven ("G-7") which consists of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Japan and
the United States). According to research recently released by the G-7's Financial Action Task Force
("Task Force"), the drug trade reaps an estimated $122 billion a year from the sale of heroin, cocaine
and cannabis in the United States and Western Europe alone. Financial Action Task Force on
Money Laundering Report ("Task Force Report"), Annex on Assessment of Narcotics-Related
Money Laundering at 5 67 ("Assessment Annex") (February 7, 1990) (on file with author). As much
as $85 billion of that sum represents the profits from drug trafficking (excluding the costs of acquiring
the drugs, the precursor chemicals, packaging, transportation, legal fees and other "costs of corrup-
tion"). Task Force Report at Part I(A) note 1. The Task Force estimates that $232,115 per minute is
laundered through the world's financial institutions. Assessment Annex at 5 67. By comparison, the
United Nations and the U.S. Congress estimate that worldwide money laundering is a $300 billion a
year business. Id at 5 10; Robert Graham, Tackling the Cocaine Menace, Financial Times 17 (April 9,
1990).
Unless otherwise indicated, all monetary values are stated in United States dollars.
2. The United States commits approximately 60 percent of its drug enforcement budget to
interdiction and policing and 30 percent toward curbing demand. The European Community simi-
larly commits more resources towards combatting supply. Graham, Tackling the Cocaine Menace at 17
(cited in note 1). Three rationales underlie this conviction.
[First,] the best deterrent and punishment is to confiscate [the criminals'] incentive. A
second rationale is that, while the higher-level and more powerful criminals rarely come into
contact with the illicit goods.., they do come into contact with the proceeds from the sale
of those goods. That contact often provides a "paper trail," or other evidence, which con-
stitutes the only connection with a violation of the law. A third rationale is that confiscat-
ing the proceeds of criminal activities is a good way to make law enforcement pay for itself.
Ethan Nadelmann, Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad- U.S. Foreign Policy and Financial Secrecy Jurisdic-
tions, 18 Inter-Am L Rev 33, 34 (1986).
3. James D. Harmon, Jr., United States Money Laundering Laws: International Implications, 9 NY L
Sch J Intl & Comp L 1, 2 (1988).
214 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 1991:213
nity is bearing down on the sophisticated practice of financial alchemy
known as money laundering.
Money laundering is "the process by which one conceals the exist-
ence, illegal source or illegal application of income and then disguises that
income in such a way as to make it appear legitimate. ' 4 In order to disas-
sociate criminals from their illicit proceeds, money launderers seek out
and exploit legal barriers that interfere with the exchange of financial in-
formation between law enforcement authorities in different countries.5
Two of the most widely recognized impediments are bank secrecy laws,
which prevent bankers from revealing data concerning their customers'
accounts, and blocking statutes, which frustrate a foreign state's discovery
efforts and its attempts to exercise jurisdiction. 6
Significant variation in national money laundering legislation also fa-
cilitates money laundering. 7 Practice varies with regard to the type of fi-
nancial institutions states monitor, the activities they consider to be
suspect and the sort of information they require to be reported. Such
discrepancies hamper coordinated investigations between states and cre-
ate opportunities for money launderers to exploit. As a result, money
launderers can create or expand an existing market for their dirty dollars
by investing in states which enact lenient monitoring measures or no
measures at all. The prospect of the considerable revenues that this in-
vestment might generate is an incentive to provide a safe haven for money
launderers. As a consequence, more responsible states are likely to suffer.
The international community recognizes this predicament and is
striving to resolve it through cooperative means.8 Since 1988 several per-
manent multinational organizations have promulgated comprehensive
4. Id at 8-9 (citing to President's Commission on Organized Crime, Interim Report to the President and
the Attorney General, The Cash Connection: Organized Crime, Financial Institutions and Money Laundering
7 (1984)).
5. Task Force Report at Part Il(C) Rec 11, Part Ill(D) Rec 30 (cited in note 1).
6. Unlike bank secrecy laws which are enacted to protect the client's privacy interests, blocking
statutes are retaliatory in nature and are enacted specifically to frustrate a foreign nation's discovery
efforts and exertion of jurisdiction. See Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law S 442, note 4
(ALl, 1987).
7. Task Force Report at Part Ill(A) Rec 3 (cited in note 1). An exhaustive study of instances of
money laundering demonstrates that money launderers conduct their activities at an international
level to take advantage of differences between national jurisdictions. Id at Part Il(D) Rec 30.
8. Summit Economic Declaration, Kyodo News Service, 1 52 (cited in note 1); "Existing domestic
laws in many countries, and the international enforcement regime established under prior multilateral
treaty arrangements, have proven unequal to the task of controlling, much less suppressing, this
vicious trade." David P. Stewart, Internationalizing the War on Drugs: The UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, 18 Denver J Intl L & Policy 387, 388 (1990);
"Given the worldwide integration of financial markets, domestic efforts alone are not sufficient to
combat money laundering and other criminal activities." FDIC Letter BL-1-89 (January 27, 1989),
text reprinted in CCH Federal Banking Reports 5 87,562 (Letter from FDIC Director to CEOs of
Insured State Nonmember Banks).
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plans exclusively directed at combatting money laundering. Each plan
either encourages or demands full implementation by their party states.
This note discusses five proposals which the national legislatures in
Europe are most likely to consider.9 Europe is a model study for several
reasons. First, a recent European Community ("E.C.") Council directive
liberated capital movements on July 1, 1990, making the E.C. banking
market the most open in the world.10 This liberal market will be very
attractive to money launderers. 1 Second, the fall of communism in East-
ern Europe has opened new avenues for drug traffickers to gain access to
Western Europe. Border controls that previously were guarded strictly in
Eastern Europe have been relaxed, allowing an influx of drugs from
Southwest Asia.' 2 Third, the principal hurdle which proposed money
laundering legislation faces is bank secrecy, a concept which originated in
Europe centuries ago and is still firmly entrenched there.' 3 Finally, efforts
to combat money laundering in Europe recently have become increasingly
9. United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Sub-
stances, UN Doc E/CONF. 82/15, reprinted in 28 ILM 493 (1989) ("UN Convention"); Task Force
Report (cited in note 1); Prevention of Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purpose of
Money-Laundering, CCH Federal Banking Law Reports 5 11,785 ("Basle Statement"); Council Direc-
tive On Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of Money Laundering, OJ Eur
Comm No C 106/6 (1990) ("Proposed EC Directive"); Council of Europe Convention On Launder-
ing, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds from Crime ("Council of Europe Conven-
tion") (reprinted in 30 ILM 148 (1991)).
10. Council Directive 88/361/EEC, OJ Eur Comm No L 178/5 (1988). As of February 1990
most E.C. member states had committed to lift their remaining restrictions on capital movement by
July 1, 1990. EC Toughens Stance on Money Laundering, Reuter Library Report (February 12, 1990)
(NEXIS, Intl file). European Community Commissioner Leon Brittan, Vice President of the Euro-
pean Commission, recognized that this directive, adopted in December 1989, ensured that the E.C.
banking market would be the most open in the world. Clare Dobie, EC Package on Laundering Soon,
The Independent 21 (anuary 12, 1990).
11. "The freedom to move capital around Europe and to open bank accounts in other countries
may, if not checked, enable drug smugglers and other organized criminals or terrorists to move funds
around and escape detection." Money Laundering Measures Approved, Financial Regulation Report
(March 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file); "There is no doubt that the Colombians are looking at 1992 and
Western Europe." Tom Mashberg, Evolution in Europe; Drugs in Europe: Signs of a Spreading Plague, New
York Times 1:21 (November 18, 1990) (quoting an unnamed US Drug Enforcement Administration
official).
12. Paul Majendie, U.S. Says Open East Europe Could Let In More Drugs, Terrorists, Reuter Library
Report (June 14, 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file) (quoting US Attorney General Richard Thornburg at' the
June 14, 1990 EC Ministers Meeting in Dublin). According to a U.S. Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion official, Latin American drug cartels have initiated an effort to ship cocaine to Europe now that
the U.S. market for crack appears to be saturated. The cartels consider Eastern Europe as "virgin
territory" for cocaine. Mashberg, Drugs in Europe at 21 (cited in note 11).
13. "The individual right to privacy.., has perhaps greater significance in the countries of the
European continent than elsewhere, because Europeans have been involved in a century-long struggle
against the aggressions of authoritarian regimes .... It is an undeniable fact that in Europe the
secrecy duty has been an essential component of the banker/client relationship for centuries." Wer-
ner dce Capitani, Banking Secrecy Today, 10 U Pa J Intl Bus L 57, 58 (1988).
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zealous. European-organizations have proffered more international initia-
tives than their counterparts in other regions.' 4
An analysis of the strengths and inconsistencies of the five European
proposals reveals an unfortunate and ironic situation. Although moti-
vated by a recognized need to develop a uniform approach to combat
money laundering, these multinational organizations have produced plans
that vary in many material respects. Consequently, by complying with
any one of these well-conceived proposals, legislatures throughout Europe
would still contribute to a legal regime that is highly conducive to money
laundering. Lawmakers should appreciate the importance of a unified
front when attacking the global money laundering menace and should
strive to reconcile the discrepancies illustrated in this note.
II. THE EUROPEAN PROPOSALS
Most Western European nations participate actively in at least five
international organizations which address the subject of money launder-
ing.' 5 All five issued formal plans designed to encourage the adoption of
uniform money laundering legislation by their member states. These pro-
posals will be introduced in this section and then compared in the analy-
sis which follows.
A. U.N. Convention
The seminal agreement, the U.N. Convention Against Illicit Traffic
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances ("U.N. Convention"),
was signed in Vienna in 1988 after five years of negotiations among 108
nations.16 The U.N. Convention is recognized as "one of the most de-
tailed and far-reaching instruments ever adopted in the field of interna-
tional law, and if widely adopted and effectively implemented, will be a
major force in harmonizing national laws and enforcement actions
14. Similar initiatives have been launched in the Western Hemisphere by the Caribbean Finan-
cial Task Force and the Organization of American States ("OAS"). Last April, the OAS proposed a
Declaration and Program of Action Ixatapa which is expected to prompt regulatory and legislative
action against money laundering in at least 20 countries in the near future. Deadline Looms for 'Final'
Ke-mr Amendment Report, Money Laundering Alert 7 (October 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
15. This note will not address the World Ministerial Drug Summit convened by the United
Kingdom, April 9-12, 1990. The six-point plan proposed by this organization focused exclusively on
demand reduction. Peter Archer, Task Force To Boost Battle Against Drugs, Press Association Newsfile
(April 9, 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file).
16. Vienna Conference adopts world-wide convention against illicit drug traffic, UN Chronicle 83
(March 1989); UN Convention (cited in note 9); see also Fred Strasser, Crime Has No Borders, So
Countries Close Ranks, Natl L J 1, 40-41 (October 30, 1989). The European Community and every
member state except for Ireland, Greece, and Portugal participated in and signed this convention.
UN Drugs, Laundering Convention Now World Law, Money Laundering Alert 7 (November 1990)
(NEXIS, MLA file).
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around the world."'17 As of December 31, 1990, thirty-two nations, in-
cluding East Germany, France, Italy and Spain, had ratified, acceded to,
or approved it.18
This convention addresses drug trafficking in general and focuses
particularly on drug-money laundering. It creates an obligation to
criminalize money laundering and provides the foundation for interna-
tional cooperation in enforcement. Signatory states may rely on the U.N.
Convention to obtain admissible evidence to be used in investigations of
and prosecutions against money launderers. 19 The convention also may
be used to extradite money launderers 20 and to confiscate their assets.2 '
B. Basle Statement
In December 1988, the Basle Supervisor's Committee22 issued a
Statement of Principles on Money Laundering Practices ("Basle State-
ment").23 Recognizing that the legal powers, roles and responsibilities for
dealing with money laundering vary widely among bank supervisory au-
thorities, committee members agreed to a five-point plan directed at es-
tablishing an ethical code of conduct for central bank supervisors to
implement and monitor. Although the plan is not itself a legally binding
document, there are various formulas that make its principles
obligatory. 24
C. Task Force Report
At its 1989 economic summit in Paris, the Group of Seven ("G-7")
formally recognized the threat of money laundering to the world's bank-
17. Stewart, 18 Denver J Intl L & Policy at 388 (cited in note 8).
18. Nations Which Have Ratified, Acceded To, or Approved the 1988 UN Convention Against Illicit
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs, Money Laundering Alert 8 (January 1991) (NEXIS, MLA file). The conven-
tion went into effect in November 1990 after Spain became the twentieth nation to ratify it. Mari-
anne Lavelle, Claudia MacLachlan and Fred Strasser, U.N. Again; International Cooperation Increases on
Drugs, Nati LJ 5, 33 (September 10, 1990).
19. UN Convention at Art 7 (cited in note 9). Also see notes 147-161 and accompanying text.
20. Id at Art 6. Also see notes 137-144 and accompanying text.
21. Id at Art 5. Also see notes 162-177 and accompanying text.
22. The Basle Supervisor's Committee was established in 1974 to strengthen supervision of in-
ternational banking activity among banks in the major industrialized countries and includes repre-
sentatives of the Central Banks and Bank Supervisory Agencies from Belgium, Canada, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Sweden, the United Kingdom and
the United States. CCH Federal Banking Law Reports 5 87,562 note 1. [Editor's note: The Supervi-
sor's Committee uses "Basle" in its official correspondence with CCH. "Basel" is the spelling most
often used in English, but the author chose to follow the Committee's choice.]
23. Basle Statement (cited in note 9).
24. This obligation arises from: (1) formal agreements among banks committing them to comply
(Austria, Italy and Switzerland); (2) formal indications by bank regulators that failure to comply could
lead to administrative sanctions (France and the United Kingdom); and (3) legally binding texts with
references to these principles (Luxembourg). Task Force Report at Part II(A)(b) (cited in note 1).
Vol. 1991:213
218 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW Vol. 1991:213
ing and financial system. 25 It created a Financial Action Task Force
("Task Force") comprised of summit participants and other interested
parties to evaluate contemporary anti-money laundering measures and to
propose additional preventative efforts. 26 The Task Force issued a final
report on April 19, 1990, which included forty recommendations directed
at stopping money laundering ("Task Force Report"). United States Dep-
uty Treasury Secretary John E. Robson, who headed the U.S. delegation,
hailed the report as "the single most comprehensive, significant and force-
ful international declaration on money laundering to date."2 7 Although
the report has no legal effect, the research and resources committed to its
formulation should have a pronounced influence on legislators. The Task
Force reconvened last year to assess and facilitate the implementation of
the recommendations and to modify them where appropriate.28
D. Proposed European Community Directive
The Council of the European Community is expected to finalize a
directive On Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the Purpose of
Money Laundering ("Proposed E.C. Directive") in June 1991.29 This
directive, to be enacted pursuant to Articles 57 and 100a of the Treaty of
Rome, will bind the twelve E.C. member states. 30 Implementation should
involve legislative enactments in most member states, even in those where
money laundering is already illegal. 31 The states must enact domestic leg-
25. The Group of Seven expressed its concern in the Summit Economic Declaration in Paris on
July 17, 1989. See Summit Economic Declaration (cited in note 1).
26. The Task Force was composed of the G-7 nations plus Australia, Austria, Belgium, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. These nations hold the charters of more
than 80 percent of the world's 500 largest banks. G-7 Nations Launch Global Laundering Assault,
Money Laundering Alert 1 (May 7, 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file). Experts from the International Mone-
tary Fund, the Bank for International Settlements and the Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development also participated. Highlights of G-7 Finance Minister Talks, Reuter Financial Report
(July 16, 1989) (NEXIS, Intl file). In December 1990 Denmark, Greece, Ireland, Norway, Portugal,
Turkey, Finland and New Zealand were formally invited to join the Task Force. Group of Seven Na-
tions Invite Nine More Countries, Money Laundering Alert 8 (December 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
27. Stephen Labaton, Group of 7 Asks Money-Laundering Curbs, New York Times D:I (April 20,
1990).
28. Economic Declaration Issued by Group of Seven Industrial Nations at the Conclusion of Their Eco-
nomic Summit in Houston, 7 Intl Trade Rptr 1127, 1133 (july 18, 1990).
29. Proposed EC Directive (cited in note 9), reviewed by the Economic and Social Committee
(opinion delivered on September 19, 1990) OJ N L 106 (1990), and amended by the European Parlia-
ment, COM(90) 593 final-SYN 254 (November 30, 1990) ("Parliament Amendment"). [As of the
editorial deadline, the E.C. Council's Committee of Permanent Representatives was reviewing the
proposed E.C. Directive, authored by the E.C. Commission, in order to settle upon a common
position.]
30. Proposed EC Directive (Preamble) (cited in note 9) (referring to the Treaty Establishing the
European Economic Community, 298 UNTS 11 (signed March 25, 1957; in force January 1, 1958)).
31. Lucy Kellaway, EC To Make Drug Money Laundering A Crime, Financial Times 16 (December
18, 1990).
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islation which meets the directive's objectives no later than January
199332
The Proposed E.C. Directive embodies a novel form of community
legislation. It requires all member states to include specific money laun-
dering provisions in their domestic criminal law.33 Whether the E.C.
Council has authority to compel member states to enact criminal legisla-
tion is in dispute. 34 The United Kingdom, while supportive of the direc-
tive's aims, expressed reservations about the criminal approach to money
laundering because it believed the European Community should not en-
joy competence in the field of criminal law.35 Recognizing that anti-
money laundering measures cannot be effective without severe penalties,
the E.C. Finance Ministers agreed to supplement the directive with a
"Declaration Between Governments" committing member states to en-
force the directive with criminal sanctions.3 6 This unusual form of legisla-
tion will protect the integrity of the European Community's financial
markets while preserving each member's sovereignty over criminal
matters.
E. Council of Europe Convention
In November 1990 the 23-member Council of Europe promulgated
the Convention on Money Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation
of Proceeds From Crime ("Council of Europe Convention").37 It was
signed during the ninth ministerial conference of the Pompidou Group,
the committee that deals with law, order and security.38
The Council of Europe Convention will extend the network of coun-
tries within Europe working together to trace and confiscate illicit pro-
32. Proposed EC Directive at Art 16 (cited in note 9).
33. Id at Art 2. The European Community may feel a particular compulsion for creating this
money laundering magnet. "With the progressive implementation of the Community's internal mar-
ket in financial services comes a heavy responsibility to ensure that these new freedoms and opportu-
nities cannot be abused," declared Sir Leon Brittan, Vice President of the European Community.
Dobie, EC Package on Laundering Soon at 21 (cited in note 10).
34. Jonathan Petre, Lords Back Money Launder Law, Daily Telegraph 12 (December 14, 1990)
(NEXIS, Intl file).
35. Peter .Guilford, Britain Blocks EC Move on Drugs Cash, The Times (December 17, 1990)
(NEXIS, Intl file).
36. Kellaway, EC to Make Drug Money Laundering a Crime at 16 (cited in note 31).
37. Council of Europe Convention (cited in note 9).
38. Peter Archer, New Euro.Pact to Fight Serious Crime, Press Association Newsfile (December 1,
1990) (NEXIS, Intl file). On November 8, 1990, the Council of Europe Convention was signed by
the representatives of the following countries: Belgium, Cyprus, Denmark, Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Iceland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom.
Council of Europe: Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, 30
ILM 148 (1991).
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ceeds. 39 Although it may be more difficult to enforce than the Proposed
E.C. Directive,40 the Council of Europe Convention offers two vital fea-
tures which the Proposed E.C. Directive lacks. First, it gives the Council
of Europe competence to propose criminal law and recognizes the need to
pursue a common criminal policy in this area.41 Second, because many
Eastern European countries are expected to join the Council of Europe
soon,42 this convention could be effective in curbing the rising tide of
crime in Eastern Europe.43 The convention will be opened to accession 44
and will enter into force three months after three states have ratified it.45
III. CRIMINALIZATION: ELEMENTS AND ISSUES
For purposes of analysis it is useful to distinguish between principal
violators of the money laundering laws and those who aid and abet their
unlawful enterprise. Principal violators include professional money laun-
derers, typically lawyers,46 who either are employed by one particular drug
cartel or who make their services available to clients on a commission
basis. 47 These parties are the primary targets of all money laundering legis-
lation. Aiders and abettors are the otherwise legitimate financial institu-
tions that are utilized by the principals as conduits for their money
laundering activities. Defining the parameters of liability for these secon-
dary parties is considerably more problematic.
A. The Principal Offense
The challenge faced by lawmakers is to prevent criminals from trans-
forming their voluminous cash proceeds from retail drug transactions into
inconspicuous investments or negotiable instruments. This can be
achieved by proscribing the conversion or transfer of property derived
39. Archer, New Euro-Pact to Fight Serious Crime (cited in note 38).
40. Peter Guilford, Council Aims At No Hiding Place For Laundered Money, The Times (October 1,
1990) (NEXIS, Intl file). While E.C. directives are enforceable by the European Court of Justice, the
Council of Europe has no court system and no enforcement mechanism.
41. Council of Europe Convention (Preamble) (cited in note 9).
42. Hungary, Poland and Yugoslavia will join the anti-drug Pompidou Group as full members
while Czechoslovakia will obtain observer status. Other Eastern European countries, notably the
Soviet Union, are considering membership. See Archer, Task Force to Boost Battle Against Drugs (cited
in note 15).
43. Guilford, Council Aims at No Hiding Place for Laundered Money (cited in note 40).
44. Council of Europe Convention at Art 37 (cited in note 9).
45. Id at Art 36(3).
46. Cash Recording Proposed in Canada; Report Issued, Money Laundering Alert 2 (December
1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
47. In 1989 the basic rate charged for laundering drug cash and other "hot" money was 7-10
percent. Jonathan Beaty and Richard Hornik, A Torrent of Dirty Dollars, Time 50 (December 18,
1989) (US ed).
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from illicit activity, as well as the concealment or disguise of the true na-
ture of such property.48
All of the European agreements propose that the first step in effec-
tively stopping money laundering globally is criminalizing it locally.49 Do-
mestic criminalization serves many purposes. For instance, some states
will be able to take advantage of laws already enacted which excuse a bank
from its duty of confidentiality when it cooperates in a criminal investiga-
tion.50 Also, in the international arena, mutual legal assistance may be
conditioned on the prior criminalization of the relevant offense.51
These proposals depend on cooperation; however, economic factors
discourage compliance. States which criminalize money laundering must
forego the profits which illicit investment generates. 52 In addition, they
48. Four of the five European proposals which define money laundering provide a definition
similar, if not identical, to the following:
-the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived from a
criminal offense, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property
or of assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such an offense or offenses
to evade the legal consequences of his actions;
-the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, move-
ment rights with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is de-
rived from a criminal offense;
Task Force Report at Part I(B) (cited in note 1). See also Council of Europe Convention at Art 6
(cited in note 9); UN Convention at Art 3(1)(b) (cited in note 9); Proposed EC Directive at Art 1
(cited in note 9).
49. The Task Force Report recommends that "[elach country should take such measures, as may
be necessary, including legislative ones, to enable it to criminalize drug money laundering." Task
Force Report at Part Ill(B) Rec 4 (cited in note 1). As of June 1990, only the United Kingdom,
France, Italy and Luxembourg had criminalized money laundering in Europe. Belgium, Germany and
Switzerland have laws awaiting adoption. Task Force Report, Annex on Money Laundering Offense,
Asset Confiscation or Forfeiture at 2-4 ("Money Laundering Offense Annex") (cited in note 1). Ire-
land, Portugal and Greece have no laws regulating this type of conduct. See Money Laundering Meas-
ures Approved (cited in note 11).
50. In Germany and the United Kingdom there are long-standing provisions which lift bank
secrecy. In Germany, for example, bank secrecy is lifted (1) when the bank is cooperating in a crimi-
nal proceeding; (2) in cases of necessity; (3) with consent by the customer. Peter Q. Noack, West
German Bank Secrecy: A Barrier to SEC Insider-Trading Investigations, 20 UC Davis L Rev 609, 621
(1987). In the United Kingdom, the exceptions to the bank secrecy obligation are: (1) compulsion of
law; (2) duty to the public to disclose; (3) interests of the bank requiring disclosure; and (4) consent of
the customer. Barclays Bank Plc v Taylor, [1989] 1 WLR 1066, 1173. Also see Joan Wadsley, Banks'
Confidentiality: A Much Reduced Duty, 106 L Q Rev 204, 205 (April 1990).
51. Typical extradition and mutual legal assistance treaties require "dual criminality;" the viola-
tion must be actionable under the laws of both treaty partners. James I.K. Knapp, Mutual Legal
Assistance Treaties as a Way to Pierce Bank Secrecy, 20 Case W Res J Intl L 405, 418-19 (1988). For
example, see Council of Europe Convention at Art 18(l)(f) (cited in note 9).
52. See Mark A. Uhlig, Panama Resisting Move to Clean Up Banking System, New York Times A:5
(October 22, 1990). The two previous times that banking secrecy was lifted in European history
(Hitler's Germany in 1933 and Occupied France in 1945), heavy outflows of funds resulted. European
Finance and Investment - Offshore Center 2; European Banking Secrecy and Disclosure - Requirements;
The Record, Financial Times 38 (March 29, 1990). Many bank secrecy jurisdictions are reluctant to
lift bank secrecy rules because they fear another massive outflow of funds. See Edouard Chambost,
Bank Accounts: A World Guide to Confidentiality (ohn Wiley & Sons, 1983). However, this fear may
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must bear the considerable administrative costs associated with money
laundering regulation.53 Finally, states recognize that money launderers,
who engage in "forum-shopping," will have fewer host countries from
which to choose as more nations criminalize money laundering. There-
fore, unscrupulous states will naturally be inclined to hold themselves out
as safe havens for money launderers and the laudable objectives of more
responsible states will have been for naught.54
Due to these economic disincentives, member states must be pres-
sured to comply. Most European international organizations, however,
lack the legal power to force change, 55 and the European Community,
while it has the power to coerce legal action, may lack jurisdiction in this
area.56
be unfounded. When the Swiss and the Cayman Islands recently compromised their bank secrecy
laws, incoming funds actually increased. Nadelmann, 18 Inter-Am L Rev at 58 (cited in note 2).
53. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives rejected a bill to record international wire
transfers because the cost of compliance was an estimated $350 million a year. Rosalind Resnick,
Money Laundering, Natl L J 1, 45 (May 7, 1990).
54. States that enact lenient money laundering measures or no measures at all can generate
considerable revenues from the investment of illicit proceeds. See Task Force Report at Part I(B)(3),
Part IH(A) Rec 3, Part III(C) Rec 20 (cited in note 1).
55. Nonetheless, there are a number of viable methods available which might be used to coerce
cooperation. The European Parliament has recommended monitoring the security standards of non-
E.C. countries and discouraging member countries from doing business with those countries whose
standards fall below those of the European Community. Europe in Drug Profit Plan, New York Times
D:4 (November 26, 1990). In May, "fifteen Western nations agreed to step up their drive against
drug trafficking by attacking money laundering in tax havens and not just in their own banking
systems." Western Nations Agree to Expand Fight Against Money Laundering, Reuter Library Report
(May 30, 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file). This approach is similar to the one exemplified in the Kerry
Amendment to the U.S. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, 31 USC S 5311 (1988). The Kerry Amend-
ment threatens termination of U.S. banking relationships when institutions of a foreign country do
not negotiate Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties ("MLATs") "in good faith." Secrecy Issues Slow Ap.
proval of Global Accords, Money Laundering Alert 7 (December 1989) (NEXIS, MLA file). Alterna-
tively, concern about reputation has proven to be an effective motivating factor. Luxembourg was
embarrassed when a U.S. sting operation caught its Bank of Credit and Commerce International
laundering drug money. Luxembourg responded by enacting money laundering legislation and coop-
erating with foreign investigators. Greg McCune, Luxembourg Treads Carefully in Drug Money Launder.
ing Case, Reuter Library Report (February 6, 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file). Swiss banks were chastened by
the disclosure that their accounts were used in a $1 billion dollar money laundering operation. The
resulting political scandal, which forced the Justice Minister to resign, led to a series of new money
laundering laws there. Christine Gorman, Crackdown on Swiss Laundry, Time 53 (April 24, 1989) (US
ed). By way of positive inducement, states also offer financial aid in return for cooperation. The
United Kingdom offered part of a £6 million aid package to Caribbean states in return for measures
taken against money launderers. See Archer, Task Force to Boost Battle Against Drugs (cited in note
15). The U.S. Congress also conditions aid on progress in money laundering MLAT negotiations.
Uhlig, Panama Resisting Move to Clean Up Banking System at A:5 (cited in note 52).
56. See notes 29-35 and accompanying text.
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B. Accomplice Liability
1. Covered Parties. All the European proposals implicitly recog-
nize that principal violators cannot launder money by themselves;57 they
need to transact with reputable parties in order to make their proceeds
appear legitimate. Since these targeted institutions normally would not
be inclined to turn down business, their cooperation must be induced by
law. The issue is which financial institutions should be obliged to identify
and report money launderers. Who should be responsible for ensuring
that illicit funds do not re-enter the stream of commerce?
The most conservative proposal would extend liability only to banks.
As gatekeepers to the world financial network, banks are a logical choice
for the imposition of liability. Banks are the most attractive target for
money launderers because of the many financial services they provide.58
The institutional infrastructure of banks also enables them to bear the
burdens associated with money laundering detection. Finally, banks are
already regulated heavily by their home state, making it easier for
lawmakers to fuse monitoring regulations with pre-existing banking
laws.5 9
The Task Force proposal has a slightly broader reach, seeking to en-
list the cooperation of non-bank financial institutions such as loan socie-
ties, credit card companies and securities brokers and dealers. 6° The
Proposed E.C. Directive has an even more expansive definition of "finan-
cial institution" which ultimately could include casinos, currency ex-
change bureaus6 1 and which may be amended to include professional
firms of accountants and lawyers. 62 Some finance ministers want to ex-
tend liability beyond financial institutions and target other cash-intensive
57. However, money launderers could use banks for this purpose if they owned them. The Task
Force recommends that nations guard against the penetration or acquisition of financial institutions
by "criminals or their confederates." Task Force Report at Part Il1(C) Rec 29 (cited in note 1).
58. Criminals use banks "to make payments and transfers of funds from one account to an-
other; to hide the source and beneficial ownership of money; and to provide storage for bank notes
through a safe-deposit facility." Basle Statement at Preamble 5 1 (cited in note 9).
59. European banks are regulated by their governments' central bank supervisors.
60. For additional examples, see Task Force Report at Part III(C) Rec 10 (cited in note 1).
61. Proposed EC Directive at Art 12 (cited in note 9). See also Money Laundering Measures
Approved, Financial Regulation Report (March 1990) (cited in note 11).
62. Dirty Money; Closing Down the Launderette, The Economist 90 (October 27, 1990). Even
where law firms are not expressly recognized as covered parties, they may be implicated by interpreta-
tion of the definition of money laundering. The U.N. Convention includes a broad provision, similar
to that found in other proposals, which makes illegal the "transfer of property, knowing that such
property is derived from any [narcotics] offense ... for the purpose of ... assisting any person who is
involved in the commission of such an offense.., to evade the legal consequences of his actions ...."
(emphasis added) United Nations Convention at Art 3(l)(b)(i) (cited in note 9). See also U.N. Treaty
on Drugs Worries the Defense Bar, Natl L J 5 (September 25, 1989).
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businesses, including football clubs and cinemas. 63 This proposal ap-
proaches the extreme exemplified by U.S. money laundering legislation,
which conceivably covers any individual regardless of his or her
business.64
Extending liability to the corporate entity is another option Euro-
pean legislatures are considering. The Task Force recommends that the
corporations themselves, not only their employees, should be subject to
criminal liability.65 Requiring covered parties to appoint officers in
charge of compliance with the money laundering laws would facilitate the
establishment of corporate liability.6 6
2. The Duties to Identify, Record and Report. Once lawmakers have
determined which parties should help to enforce the money laundering
laws, the next step is to determine their obligations under the laws. In
order to fight money laundering effectively, it is crucial that financial in-
stitutions screen undesirable customers.67 Consequently, most of the Eu-
ropean proposals recommend that subject institutions check the
identification of all prospective account holders when establishing busi-
ness relations. 68 The Proposed E.C. Directive also will require banks to
acquire and record the identification of customers who enter into transac-
tions of European Currency Unit 15,000 or more.69 Some proposals
would impose a duty to determine the ultimate beneficiary of the ac-
63. George Graham, The Paris Summit; Task Force To Hunt Drug Money Laundering, Financial
Times 2 Uuly 17, 1989).
64. See 31 USC S 5312 (1988) (covering records and reports on monetary instruments
transactions).
65. Task Force Report at Part Ill(B) Rec 7 (cited in note 1).
66. Id at Part Ill(C) Rec 20(a).
67. Id at Part II(C) Rec 12.
68. Basle Statement at Part II (cited in note 9); Task Force Report at Part Ill(C) Rec 12 (cited in
note 1); Proposed EC Directive at Art 3 (cited in note 9). The Proposed E.C. Directive requires all
financial institutions to take "reasonable measures" to ascertain the real identity of the person on
whose behalf a transaction was carried out. Id. The Bank of England recently published "Guidance
Notes" ranking in order of reliability the best possible identification documents: (1) passport; (2)
armed forces identity card; (3) employer identity card; and (4) full driving license. Birth certificates,
credit cards, student union cards and provisional driving licenses may not be acceptable because they
can be forged easily. David Lascelles, Bankers Seek to Scrub Out Money Laundering, Financial Times 7
(December 11, 1990).
69. Proposed EC Directive at Art 3(2) (cited in note 9). The Task Force recommends that
financial institutions require full identification of persons engaging in "large" transactions (including
the identification and location of transferees), especially when they are acting on behalf of others.
Task Force Report at Part 1I(C) Rec 12 (interpreted in Changes to Money.Laundering Measure, Financial
Regulation Report (April 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
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count. 70 This could toll the death knell for the infamous "anonymous"
and "numbered" accounts.71
Once covered parties have acquired this identification information,
some proposals would require them to record it.72 The Task Force deter-
mined that these records are invaluable to law enforcement authorities for
conducting their inquiries. 73 The Proposed E.C. Directive stands for the
same proposition and probably will require financial institutions to keep
recorded identification information on file for five years, even after rela-
tions with their clients have ended.74
The most critical element of any scheme to prevent money launder-
ing is the financial institutions' duty to report particular activities to the
proper authorities. The international agreements differ in regard to
which predicate acts should trigger this duty to report. All of the propos-
als would have subject institutions report any "unusual" or "suspicious"
transactions, but none of them define these terms.75 The Task Force pro-
poses that all complex and "unusually large" transactions be treated as
inherently suspicious. 76 Others would consider legally suspicious any
transaction involving an offshore banking haven.77 The Proposed E.C.
70. Proposed EC Directive at Art 3(5) (cited in note 9); Task Force Report at Part Ill(C) Rec 12
(cited in note 1).
71. The Task Force specifically recommends that "anonymous accounts or accounts in obvi-
ously fictitious names" should be prohibited. Id. As a consequence, attorneys would no longer be
able to open an account on a client's behalf and protect that client's anonymity through the attorney-
client privilege.
72. Id at Part Ill(C) Rec 12; Proposed EC Directive at Art 3 (cited in note 9).
73. Task Force Report at Part I1(C) Recs 12, 15 (cited in note 1).
74. Proposed EC Directive at Art 4 (cited in note 9).
75. The Proposed E.C. Directive's use of "unusual transactions" is intentionally vague. Dirty
Money; Closing Down the Launderette, The Economist 90 (cited in note 62). Australia is the only
nation that has attempted to define "suspicious transaction" in its money laundering legislation.
According to the Cash Transaction Reports Act of 1988, a suspicious transaction "causes a cash
dealer to have a feeling of apprehension or mistrust ... considering its unusual.., circumstances or
. . . the persons with whom they are dealing, and is based on . . . all relevant factors including
knowledge of the person's ... business or social background, behavior and personal appearance."
Brent Fisse, France, England Press Money Laundering Initiatives; Australia Begins Implementation of Cash
Transaction Reporting Law, Money Laundering Alert 7 Uuly 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file). See also Cash
Transaction Reports Act, No 64 (Austl 1988).
76. The Task Force recommends that financial institutions scrutinize and record "in writing"
the details of all large transactions, especially those with no "visible lawful purpose." Task Force
Report at Part Il1(C) Rec 15 (cited in note I).
77. The Australian legislature has determined that transactions to which "known narcotic
source or transit countries" are parties are to be considered inherently suspicious. In its guidelines
the Cash Transactions Reporting Act of 1988 lists nineteen countries "known to facilitate money
laundering.., due to strict bank secrecy laws." This list includes Luxembourg, the Cook Islands and
Switzerland. Fisse, France, England Press Money Laundering Initiatives; Australia Begins Implementation of
Cash Transactions, Money Laundering Alert at 7 (cited in note 75). See also, Task Force Report at
Part il(C) Rec 21 (cited in note 1).
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Directive may require special attention for transactions "particularly
likely, by [their] nature, to be related to money laundering."78
Because the "suspicious transaction" concept is so critical, yet diffi-
cult to define adequately, some authorities have advocated an entirely dif-
ferent approach. Some members of the Task Force recommend that
every nation adopt mandatory reporting laws covering all currency trans-
actions over a legislatively determined amount. 79 Such a system currently
exists in the United States and Australia, where all transactions above
$10,000 (U.S. and Australian currency respectively) must be reported. 0
A related proposal suggests all electronic wire transfers be recorded re-
gardless of their amount.81 These suggestions are widely criticized as too
expensive, technologically impracticable, and not especially helpful to the
enforcement agencies. A more popular option is to ban all cash transac-
tions above a designated limit.8 2 In June 1990 Italy's cabinet approved a
draft law that would ban all cash transactions in excess of L 20 million
($16,000).83 France recently passed a similar law.8 4 The European Com-
munity also may wish to consider a recent U.S. Senate proposal to put bar
codes on currency of $20 or more.85 This proposal may be easier to im-
plement in the European Community than in the United States if a new
pan-European currency is introduced. The rationale behind these laws is
that cash is no longer the preferred method of payment for legitimate
transactions, whereas it is virtually indispensable for a wide range of illegal
activities.8 6
78. Proposed EC Directive at Art 5 (cited in note 9).
79. Task Force Report at Part Il1(C) Rec 24 (cited in note 1).
80. Fisse, France, England Press Money Laundering Initiatives; Australia Begins Implementation of Cash
Transaction Reporting Law, Money Laundering Alert at 7 (cited in note 75). See also 31 USC SS 5311-
5326 (1988); 26 USC S 6051 (1986); Cash Transaction Reports Act (cited in note 75).
81. Amendment to the Council Directive On Prevention of Use of the Financial System for the
Purpose of Money Laundering, COM(90) 593 final-SYN 254 at recital Ila (November 30, 1990)
("Amended Proposal for EC Directive"). See also Task Force Report at Part 11(C) Rec 24 (cited in
note 1). Recording all wire transfers will be problematic as $1 trillion or more passes through the
banking wires each day. Money Laundering; Putting an Ear to the Wires, Time 60 (October 16, 1989)
(US ed).
82. See Lucy Kellaway, Commission Wheels Out Some Heavy Guns in War Against Dirty Money,
Financial Times 3 (February 15, 1990); Cash Recording Proposed in Canada; Report Issued, Money Laun-
dering Alert 12 (December 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
83. Transactions over L 20 million would be permitted if made by check, bank transfer or credit
card so that they could be traced. Italian Cabinet Moves to Stem Mafia Money Laundering, Reuter
Library Report June 1, 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file).
84. Task Force Report at Part I(B)(1) Rec 6 (cited in note 1) (prohibiting cash transactions over
FR 150,000).
85. Robert Safian, Making News With Money Laundering, Am Law 82 (December 1989).
86. Jonathan J. Rusch, Hue and Cry in the Counting.House: Some Observations on the Bank Secrecy
Act, 37 Cath U L Rev 465, 466 (1988). See also Task Force Report at Part I(B)(1) (cited in note 1)
(discussing cash intensiveness of European countries) and Task Force Report at Part Ill(C) Rec 25
(cited in note 1) (encouraging the replacement of cash transfers).
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3. When to Report. A subject firm's next concern is when to re-
port a suspect transaction to the appropriate authorities. In the United
Kingdom that duty is conditional on the nature of the underlying of-
fense.8 7 In some instances the bank need not report to the authorities
unless requested to do so.88 The Task Force recommends that firms re-
port their suspicions promptly rather than wait for a request.89 In order
to provide certainty of when reporting is required, it recommends
lawmakers prescribe a uniform compliance period running from the day
that the principal proposed the transaction. Finally, it suggests that it be
illegal for bankers to tell customers that they are under investigation. 9°
There also are a number of practical problems that no proposal has
yet addressed. It is not clear how firms should handle a client who pro-
poses a suspect transaction. If a bank refuses to execute a transaction, it
may expose itself to civil liability.9 ' If it executes the transaction, it could
face criminal money laundering charges. One solution to this predica-
ment is to provide a safe harbor allowing banks to execute suspicious
transactions so long as they report them promptly to the authorities.
92
This approach preserves bank-customer relations and is less likely to frus-
trate efforts to pursue the beneficiaries of a suspected money laundering
operation. However, conditioning such a safe harbor on an obligation to
report raises another problem. It would require the bank to breach the
duty of confidentiality which banks in some states owe to their customers
so that, once again, the bank may face civil liability. 93 To avoid this prob-
lem, the European proposals expressly provide a safe harbor from bank
secrecy laws for banks that cooperate in good faith with money launder-
87. When a bank suspects that deposited funds will be used for terrorist purposes, it must report
the transfer immediately. A bank's failure to report due to negligence could result in conviction.
Similarly, when the funds appear to be related to drug trafficking, a bank has a legal obligation to
report its suspicions. With regard to any other criminal offense, a bank has the right, but not the
duty, to report its suspicions, and must cooperate when requested to do so. Money Laundering Meas-
ures Approved, Financial Regulation Report (cited in note 11).
88. Id.
89. Task Force Report at Part 1I(C) Rec 16 (cited in note 1) (interpreted in Changes to Money
Laundering Measure (cited in note 69)).
90. Task Force Report at Part Il1(C) Rec 17 (cited in note 1). See also Proposed EC Directive at
Art 8 (cited in note 9).
91. Some U.S. courts recognize a cause of action in tort when a bank refuses credit to a cus-
tomer who the bank wrongfully suspects is involved with organized crime. See Ricci v Key Bancshares
of Maine, Inc, 662 F Supp 1132 at 1139 (Me 1987).
92. In Australia, financial institutions and their personnel have a "safe harbor" from a money
laundering offense if they cooperate by giving information about suspicious transactions to the Com-
mission as soon as practicable. Therefore, they have the opportunity to continue a transaction with-
out running the risk of money laundering prosecution. United States law provides no comparable
safeguard. Fisse, France, England Press Money Laundering Initiatives; Australia Begins Implementation of
Cash Transaction Reporting Law, Money Laundering Alert at 7 (cited in note 75).
93. See note 119 and accompanying text.
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ing investigations.94 In countries where there is no obligation to report,
the Task Force recommends that banks which are suspicious about the
operations of a customer should close that customer's accounts.95
4. Scienter. The element of scienter also is likely to be a charged
issue in the parliaments of Europe. The U.N. Convention and French
law require the bank to have knowledge of the concealment or conversion
of proceeds in order to impose liability.96 However, if the laws aimed at
aiders and abettors allow bankers to assert the defense that they did not
think or did not know that a particular transaction was "suspicious" or
otherwise reportable, they are likely to be ineffectual. 97 Recognizing this,
some delegates of the Task Force have determined that a negligence stan-
dard is more appropriate. 98 Moreover, a negligent failure to comply with
the money laundering laws may carry penalties just as severe as willful
violations.99
Large banks with multiple branches present a particularly problem-
atic scienter issue. Knowing or negligent acquiescence of bank employees
in these transactions may bring about separate corporate liability for the
bank. Monitoring the many teller windows of a multi-branch institution
to prevent such corporate liability presents practical difficulties for the
bank. Through a practice called "smurfing," money launderers are able
to structure their transactions in ways that avoid suspicion. 1°° To frus-
trate this practice, banks now use computers to aggregate and record each
customer's daily transactions and bring suspicious figures to the attention
94. See note 121 and accompanying text.
95. Task Force Report at Part Ill(C) Rec 19 (cited in note I).
96. UN Convention at Art 3(1), 3) (cited in note 9); Task Force Report, Money Laundering
Offense Annex at 2 (cited in note 1).
97. A likely development is that constructive knowledge will be imputed to banks as more infor-
mation concerning money laundering practices proliferates. Pursuant to the Basic Statement man-
date, national bank supervisors regularly publish "Guidance Notes" to keep their members appraised
of what constitutes "suspicious transactions" by bank customers. Lascelles, Bankers Seek to Scrub Out
Money Laundering at 7 (cited in note 68).
98. Task Force Report at Part I(B) Rec 6 (cited in note 1). A survey of scienter standards in
different countries is provided in the Task Force Report, Money Laundering Offense Annex at 2-4
(cited in note 1). The Council of Europe Convention also allows for states' imposition of a negligence
standard. Council of Europe Convention at Art 6 (3)(a) (cited in note 9).
99. Luxembourg bankers may face a prison term just for looking the other way. Bank Secrecy
Laws Stronger; Laundering Now a Crime, Money Laundering Alert 7 (March 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
McCune, Luxembourg Treads Careflly in Drug Money Laundering Case (cited in note 55).
100. "Smurfing" is the practice of structuring currency transactions to avoid triggering a bank's
legal reporting obligation. See Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money Laundering, and the Federal Criminal
Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 Fla L Rev 287 (1989).
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of bank supervisors.' 0 The law should take these technological develop-
ments into account when evaluating corporate scienter.1 02
Another factor which will influence the scienter standard of corpo-
rate liability is legislatively imposed compliance programs. Most of the
international initiatives call upon financial institutions to introduce and
maintain systems of internal controls, training programs for employees,
and regular audits to test the system. 10 3 The courts would be remiss not
to consider the state of these programs when they make determinations
concerning imputed awareness of money laundering practices. 104 Fur-
thermore, states should coordinate their efforts and assume responsibility
for the development of these programs; otherwise, scienter standards
could vary dramatically throughout Europe. 0 5
5. Predicate Offenses. The European proposals vary with regard to
the types of underlying activity which should trigger a firm's reporting
requirement.10 6 The Council of Europe and Basle Committee Supervi-
sors concluded that the proceeds from any illicit activity could qualify. 0 7
101. See 1990 Banking Software Directory, The Magazine of Bank Management 52 Uuly, 1990)
(formerly Magazine of Bank Administration).
102. In September 1990 the U.S. Treasury Department issued a regulation which requires finan-
cial institutions to use aggregation-capable computers if they already have them. Mandatory Aggrega-
tion of Currency Transactions for Certain Financial Institutions and Mandatory Magnetic Media
Reporting of Currency Transaction Reports, 55 Fed Reg 36663 (September 6, 1990). See also Treas-
ury Proposes Two Regulations, Money Laundering Alert 1 (October 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
103. In order to maintain their licenses, U.K. banks must have sufficient controls in place to
detect and report money laundering and suspicious banking practices. Secrecy Issues Slow Approval of
Global Accords, Money Laundering Alert 7 (December 1989) (NEXIS, MLA file). The Proposed E.C.
Directive would require firms to set up internal procedures to help them detect and defeat laundering
operations. It recommends that firms train their staff to understand both the directive and how to
recognize and deal with suspect transactions. Proposed EC Directive at Art I 1 (cited in note 9). The
Task Force recommends that financial institutions be required to develop internal controls, carefully
screen their employees, audit the controls, and maintain an ongoing employee training program.
Task Force Report at Part I(C) Rec 20 (cited in note 1). See also, Basle Statement at Part V (cited in
note 9).
104. The Task Force appears to advocate government-issued guidelines only as educational tools.
Task Force Report at Part III(C) Rec 28 (cited in note 1). However, it seems reasonable to assume
that prosecutors will not hesitate to resort to these guidelines for their own legal ends to establish
what a bank knew or should have known.
105. Discrepancies in scienter standards are not merely of academic concern. The Task Force has
recognized that different standards concerning the intent element of "a money laundering infraction
could affect the ability and willingness of countries to provide each other with mutual legal assist-
ance." Task Force Report at Part III(D) Rec 33 (cited in note 1).
106. Laundering is illegal only when it relates to some sort of illicit activity. Lawmakers must
determine which sorts of activities should qualify as the predicate acts for the money laundering
offense. Jonathan Beaty and Richard Hornik, A Torrent of Dirty Dollars, Time 50 (December 18, 1989)
(US ed) (observing that multinational corporations and wealthy individuals regularly launder money
with impunity for accounting and tax reasons).
107. The Council of Europe Convention applies to the proceeds of any criminal offense. Council
of Europe Convention at Art 1(e) (cited in note 9). However, parties may limit covered categories of
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The Task Force targets all "serious crimes," 108 the same approach pro-
posed by the European Parliament and the E.C. Commission. 10 9 Accord-
ing to the European Parliament, "serious crimes" include money
counterfeiting, prostitution, kidnapping and hostage-taking. 110 After
much debate, the E.C. Council resolved that only drug-affiliated funds
should qualify."1 Similarly, the U.N. Convention and Luxembourg's
new money laundering statute cover only money connected with drugs.1 12
There is much controversy over whether to include tax evasion and
other fiscal offenses as criminal behavior in the money laundering stat-
utes. In several European states this sort of behavior is not even consid-
ered criminal.1 13
6. The Penalty. Penal sanctions for aiding and abetting the viola-
tion of money laundering laws vary widely throughout the world.1 14 Fines
offenses in their instruments of ratification. Id at Arts 2(2), 6(4). The Basle Statement applies "not
only to drug money but to the deposit, transfer and concealment of money derived from many forms
of illicit activity, including robbery, terrorism and fraud." David Lascelles, Banks Warned About Con-
trols on Money Laundering, Financial Times 28 (November 14, 1989) (quoting Roger Barnes, Head of
Banking Supervision for the Bank of England). Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands each have general
provisions concerning the proceeds of crime. The United Kingdom and France would prefer that
only funds related to drugs fall within the purview of money laundering legislation. Kellaway, Com.
mission Wheels Out Some Heavy Guns in War Against Dirty Money at 3 (cited in note 82). Money Laun.
dering Directive Drafted, Financial Regulation Report (December 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file).
108. Task Force at Part I(B) Rec 5 (cited in note 1).
109. Amended Proposal for EC Directive at Art 2 (cited in note 81).
110. Money Laundering Directive Drafted, Financial Regulation Report (December 1990) (cited in
note 103). By comparison, the U.S. list of "specified unlawful activities" is much longer and contin-
ues to expand. It now includes crimes such as fraud and environmental offenses. US Banks Seek UK.
Style 'Safe Harbor' Protection, Money Laundering Alert 6 Uanuary 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
111. Europe Community Diary, Origin Universal News Service Limited (December 20, 1990)
(NEXIS, Intl file). The European Commission will set up a working party to consider the possibility
of uniformly extending the directive to other criminal activities. Banking: Political Agreement on Money
Laundering Proposal, European Information Service (January 1991) (NEXIS, Intl file).
112. UN Convention at Art 3 (cited in note 9). In January, the government of Luxembourg
issued a statement underscoring that the new money laundering laws were not aimed at tax evasion,
but rather at cases where there is "material proof of an offense of drug money laundering." Bank
Secrecy Laws Stronger, Laundering Now a Crime, Money Laundering Alert at 7 (cited in note 99).
113. In the United Kingdom, Luxembourg and Switzerland, violations of tax and currency con-
trol laws do not carry criminal sanctions. As proposed, the original U.K. Criminal Justice (Interna-
tional Cooperation) Bill included fiscal offenses as predicate offenses, but this was reconsidered after
much public criticism by the British Bankers Association and the Law Society; "Tax law in unscrupu-
lous hands can be a powerful instrument of oppression." D.J. Elvidge and Ej. Henbrey, Bill Offers
Britain's Co-operation Too Freely, Financial Times 21 (March 6, 1990).
114. The United Kingdom's Drug Trafficking Offenses Act of 1986 imposes a prison term of up
to fourteen years on those who facilitate the concealment, removal or transfer of drug trafficking
proceeds by or on behalf of another. Secrecy Issues Slow Approval of Global Accords, Money Laundering
Alert at 7 (cited in note 103). In Hong Kong this same offense carries a fourteen-year prison term and
a $5 million fine. Id. In Luxembourg "the law imposes a prison term of up to five years and a fine of
up to 50 million Luxfrancs." Bank Secrecy Laws Stronger; Laundering Now a Crime, Money Laundering
Alert at 7 (cited in note 99). Under U.S. law, "bank officials who knowingly conceal the source of
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range from $500,000 to $5 million and prison terms extend to twenty
years. 115 Banks in the United States and United Kingdom may lose their
charter for egregious violations. 1 6 Banks in other states may face addi-
tional penal regimes administered by self-regulating organizations. 1 7 Un-
fortunately, none of the proposals currently under consideration by the
European legislatures addresses the prescription of uniform sanctions.
Presumably this is because considerations of resources and national policy
concerning deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution drive decisions of
this sort. Nonetheless, major discrepancies in penalties between states
could eviscerate everything that this collective regional effort seeks to
achieve.
C. The Most Formidable Obstacle: Bank Secrecy
The principal objection to money laundering legislation is that it is a
direct affront to the consumer's right to privacy secured by bank secrecy
laws. Bank secrecy has a long and distinguished history in Europe. 18 To-
day, every Western European nation imposes some form of obligation on
bankers to maintain the confidentiality of their clients' dealings. 1 9 Even
illicit money can be fined up to $500,000 or twice the amount of the money they launder, and impris-
oned for up to 20 years." Janice Castro, The Cash Cleaners, Time 65 (October 24, 1988) (US ed).
115. See sources cited in note 114.
116. Pursuant to their Basle Statement mandate, national bank supervisors now threaten to re-
voke the licenses of member banks that blatantly fail to comply with promulgated money laundering
policy. Lascelles, Bankers Seek to Scrub Out Money Laundering at 7 (cited in note 68). Banks in the
United Kingdom must employ adequate safeguards to uncover and report money laundering and
suspicious banking practices in order to retain their licenses. Secrecy Issues Slow Approval of Global
Accords at 7 (cited in note 103). "[A U.S.] bill which passed the House by a 406-0 vote on April 25,
1990 contains a 'death penalty' clause, allowing regulators to revoke a bank or savings institution
charter and lift its deposit insurance if the institution or its officials are convicted of money launder-
ing charges." Resnick, Money Laundering at 45 (cited in note 53).
117. A self-regulating organization in Switzerland recently fined eleven Swiss banks for breaching
voluntary rules designed to prevent money laundering. Fines ranged from SFR 1,000-250,000. Eleven
Swiss Banks Fined for Lack of Diligence, Reuter Financial Report (September 26, 1990) (NEXIS, Intl file).
118. The first written reference to banking secrecy is found in the statutes of Italy's Banco Am-
brosiano in 1593. European Finance and Investment-Offshore Centre 2; European Banking Secrecy and
Disclosure-Requirements, Financial Times 38 (March 29, 1990) (cited in note 52). There are at least
five justifications for individual use of bank secrecy jurisdictions: (1) capital flight from political, reli-
gious, and racial prosecution; (2) freedom from oppressive government, confiscatory taxes and the
risks of war; (3) freedom from unwanted popularity and threats to one's reputation; (4) protection
from legal judgment; and (5) protection from the increasing threat of robbery. Comment, Piercing
Offshore Bank Secrecy Laws Used to Launder Illegal Narcotics Profits: The Cayman Islands Example, 20 Tex
Intl LJ 133, 134-35 (1985).
119. The Task Force provides a survey of the laws in bank secrecy jurisdictions. Task Force
Report, Annex on Bank Secrecy Laws and Reporting Requirements Annex ("Bank Secrecy Annex")
(cited in note 1). Most have developed some sort of banking secrecy law. Silvia P. Pifiera-Vasquez,
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and International Banking: A Conflict of Interests, 43 U Miami L Rev 449, 467
(1985). These laws are prescribed in the privacy codes of civil law countries, and in the common law
of Great Britain. Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank [1924] 1 KB 461. See also Barclays
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E.C. law requires that banks doing business in the European Community
observe bank secrecy laws.' 20 Consequently, bankers argue that compli-
ance with the money laundering laws would subject them to either crimi-
nal or civil liability. Taking this into consideration, most proposals
provide an express exemption of the bank secrecy laws for banks that
cooperate in good faith in money laundering investigations.' In this




Criminalizing the conduct of money laundering is only half the bat-
tle. The next step is to detect and punish the perpetrators. This will
require unprecedented cooperation among the investigative, prosecutorial
and judicial authorities of the European nations. 123
A. Investigation
The practice of modern day money laundering rarely occurs solely ir
one country. Furthermore, no single transaction is likely to provide
enough evidence upon which to build a case. The objective of the report-
ing requirements outlined above is to provide a "paper trail" for enforce-
Bank Plc v Taylor, [19891 1 WLR 1066 (cited in note 50) (common law duty of confidentiality between
a banker and his customers has survived despite recently enacted money laundering legislation). In
comparison, the U.S. position, as enunciated in US v Miller, 425 US 435 (1976), is that records about
an individual, created and maintained by a third party such as a bank, do not belong to that person,
but instead belong to the institution. Thus, a U.S. citizen has no right to control the release or
transfer of those records.
120. Hillegom Municipality v Cornelis Hillenius, (Case 110/84) [1986] 3 CMLR 422 (European
Court of Justice Decision) (interpreting Art 12(1) of EC Council Directive 77/780).
121. Proposed EC Directive at Art 9 (cited in note 9); UN Convention at Art 5(3) (cited in note
9); Task Force Report at Part I1(A) Rec 2, Part Ill(C) Rec 16 (cited in note 1). The United Kingdom
made such a change three years ago and France proposed a similar law in May 1990. William
Dawkins, OECD Meeting in Paris; Drug Money Laundering Laws to be Tightened, Financial Times 6 (May
31, 1990).
122. One of the drafters of the U.S. Right to Financial Privacy Act argues that privacy protec-
tions and effective money laundering laws can be reconciled. Abbe David Lowell, Privacy, Tough
Money Laws Do Mix, Natl L J 13, 28 (September 15, 1986). However, the problem may not be so
simple. If the right to privacy recognized in many European codes and constitutions does reach bank
accounts, then the legislature cannot lift it simply by fiat. The European Convention on Human
Rights also may protect depositors' privacy. European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 11950] 213 UNTS 221 (signed November 4, 1950; in force Sep-
tember 3, 1953).
123. "The development of cross-border transactions and financial services and the removal of
exchange controls.., can easily complicate the process of tracing the origin of relevant funds. Thus,
in order to combat money laundering, an international approach is required." Money Laundering
Directive Drafted, Financial Regulation Report (cited in note 107).
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ment agents to trace back to the principal offender. The challenge is to
follow this trail across multiple national boundaries.
All five European proposals encourage efforts to coordinate law en-
forcement assistance, cooperation and training. 24 Without explicitly out-
lining a means for putting international enforcement into practice, the
proposals yield two viable approaches to coordinate investigation efforts.
The first is to create a network among state-designated financial intelli-
gence offices.' 25 In order to be effective, each state need have only one
such office and the authority to share information with sister offices in
foreign states. 126 The French have taken the initiative in this area by
creating a state agency modelled after the U.S. Financial Crimes Enforce-
ment Network ("FinCEN"). 127 FinCEN is a multi-agency operation
which serves as the primary intelligence and analysis resource to support
money laundering investigations in the United States. 28
The second approach envisions a supranational European police
force, possibly under the aegis of the European Community, with a single
coordinating bureau. 129 This body presumably would have access to all
the financial intelligence of its member states. The Task Force Report
recommends that the Customs Cooperation Council and Interpol have
responsibility for monitoring the global flow of money and dissemination
124. UN Convention at Art 9 (cited in note 9); Task Force Report at Part Ill(C) Recs 31-32 (cited
in note 1); Basle Statement, Parts IV-V (cited in note 9); Proposed EC Directive, Preamble 5 6 (cited
in note 9).
125. The Task Force characterizes this proposal as an "international information exchange"
through which information relating to suspicious transactions, persons and corporations is relayed
spontaneously between competent authorities. Task Force Report at Part Ill(C) Rec 32 (cited in note
1).
126. Confidentiality concerns may affect this exchange of information. The Council of Europe
Convention implies that failure to assure confidentiality may justify refusal to cooperate. Council of
Europe Convention at Art 33 (cited in note 9). In several recent cases, foreign governments have
declined to provide information to U.S. prosecutors because they know it would become subject to
public disclosure. Strasser, Crime Has No Borders at 40 (cited in note 16).
127. FinCEN is a federal agency of 200 employees with a $16 million budget and includes former
employees of the U.S. Customs Service, the Internal Revenue Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco
and Firearms, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Secret Service, Drug Enforcement Administration and
liaisons with the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency and the French
government. Bruh Named Director of Treasury's FinCEN, Money Laundering Alert 3 (April 1990)
(NEXIS, MLA file).
128. Id.
129. The E.C. Ministers of Justice and Home Affairs are discussing the possibility of developing
an information system for use by all member states. The project is expected to start with a European
drug file. Closer Co-operation on All EC Borders, Financial Times (December 1989) (NEXIS, Intl file).
The European Community already has taken steps toward creating a supranational European police
force with a central coordinating bureau in Brussels. Strasser, Crime Has No Borders at 40 (cited in
note 16).
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of information on money laundering.130 The United States has suggested
that the Bank for International Settlements, the International Monetary
Fund, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
could also play a role in this endeavor. 13' The banks themselves would
not have any investigative duties in any case.132
Regardless of which approach is chosen for policing the global finan-
cial network, it is clear that national legislation must be harmonized in
order to assist and accommodate the investigative authorities. The Coun-
cil of Europe contemplates extensive use of telephone wiretapping and
official access to computer systems.1 33 The U.N. Convention expressly
endorses the investigative technique of "controlled delivery" as a means
of identifying drug traffickers. 34 Broad investigative powers such as these
may raise constitutional issues in many states.135
Technological problems can be addressed once a model is chosen
and the institutional infrastructure is in place. Computers must be devel-
oped to record and trace the tremendous volume of financial activity that
transpires every day.' 36
B. Extradition
Provisions in the Task Force Report and the U.N. Convention
should make it easier for prosecuting states to obtain the extradition of
130. Task Force Report at Part Il(D) Rec 31 (cited in note 1). Interpol, the 67-year-old Interna-
tional Police Organization, has a staff of 280 and offices in each of its 150 member nations (soon to
include the Soviet Union). Resources recently have been committed to a new $20 million headquar-
ters in Lyons, France which features advanced data-processing and communications technology. To-
day, well over half of the organization's criminal files are dedicated to drug trafficking and money
laundering. Alan Riding, Interpol Regrets Shady Past; Vows Better Future, New York Times A:4 (Febru-
ary 22, 1990). The Council of Europe also recognizes Interpol as an appropriate conduit for commu-
nications related to money laundering. Council of Europe Convention at Art 24(3) (cited in note 9).
131. World Laundering Awareness Grows, U.S. Report Says, Money Laundering Alert 6 (April 1990)
(NEXIS, MLA file) (referring to 1989 Annual State Department Report to Congress on the Interna-
tional Narcotics Problem).
132. According to Sir Leon Brittan, E.C. Commissioner for Financial Institutions, "[We are not
seeking to convert (banks) into policemen." (as quoted in Dobie, EC Package on Laundering Soon at 21
(cited in note 10)).
133. Council of Europe Convention at Art 4(2) (cited in note 9).
134. UN Convention at Art 11 (cited in note 9). Controlled delivery is the technique of allowing
an illicit consignment of drugs to pass through the territory of one or more countries under the
supervision of competent authorities with a view to identifying persons involved in the commission of
a covered offense. Id at Art 1(g).
135. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court recently decided that the Fourth Amendment of the
U.S. Constitution does not apply to searches by U.S. agents of property that is owned by a nonresi-
dent alien and located in a foreign country. US v Verdugo-Urquidez, - US -, 110 S Ct 1056 (1990).
136. Finance experts have long called for increased surveillance of wire transfers. See note 75 and
accompanying text. Two principal U.S. clearing houses process more than $174.1 billion in wire
transfers per hour. Wire Transfer Rules Proposed, 40,000 Are Affected, Money Laundering Alert 1 (No-
vember 1990) (NEXIS, MLA file).
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money launderers abroad. 137 In fact, the U.N. Convention may serve as a
universal extradition treaty.1 38 It provides that when no extradition
treaty exists, a party to the convention may rely on it. 13 9 It also amends
and updates existing treaties between party states to include the offense of
money laundering. 140
Two of the proposals call upon states to expedite extradition proce-
dures and to simplify evidentiary requirements relating to those proce-
dures. 141 The Task Force encourages states to allow direct transmission
of extradition requests between appropriate ministries and to extradite
persons based solely on warrants of arrest or judgment. 142 The U.N.
Convention provides that states may not refuse requests for the extradi-
tion of money launderers on the grounds that they involve fiscal, political
or politically motivated offenses. 143 Arrangements such as these may ac-
count for the fact that the number of criminals extradited for money laun-
dering is already increasing. 144
C. Acquiring Admissible Evidence
Modern law enforcement requires a means for the acquisition of evi-
dence abroad in a form admissible in the courts of the requesting state.
The Basle Statement and the Proposed E.C. Directive do not propose any
means for facilitating this exchange. The Task Force endorses a network
of bilateral and multilateral arrangements 145 to provide compulsory meas-
137. Task Force Report at Part I(D) Rec 40 (cited in note 1); UN Convention at Art 6 (cited in
note 9). Extradition appears to be one weapon that the drug lords truly fear. On January 24, 1988,
Columbia's drug lords declared "total war" on anyone who favors extradition. The next day Colom-
bian Attorney General Hoyos was assassinated. Jill Smolowe, The Drug Thugs, Time 28 (March 7,
1988) (US ed).
138. Strasser, Crime Has No Borders at 41 (cited in note 16).
139. UN Convention at Art 6(1)-(4) (cited in note 9).
140. Id at Art 6(1)-(2).
141. Task Force Report at Part Il(D) Rec 40 (cited in note 1); UN Convention at Art 6(7) (cited
in note 9).
142. Task Force Report at Part Il(D) Rec 40 (cited in note 1).
143. UN Convention at Art 3(10) (cited in note 9). However, see Council of Europe Convention
at Art 18(1)(d) (cited in note 9), which sanctions refusal to cooperate in confiscation proceedings on
the grounds that the offense to which the request relates is a political or fiscal offense.
144. Nadelmann, 18 Inter-Am L Rev at 79 (cited in note 2).
145. There is a growing trend among states to negotiate mutual legal assistance treaties
("MLATs") to facilitate and expedite the exchange of evidence. An MLAT is a treaty which creates a
binding obligation on the treaty partners to render assistance to each other in criminal investigations
by providing evidence in a form admissible in judicial proceedings. These have been bilateral for the
most part. There are three reasons states may prefer bilateral to multilateral treaties: (1) a bilateral
treaty usually goes farther than a multilateral one (which may only reflect the most general and
common elements of agreement among several states); (2) in a bilateral treaty a government selects a
single country with whom it wishes to negotiate and to whom it wishes to provide information; (3)
MLATs can involve a variety of legal systems which may be hard to reconcile (such as the common
law and the civil law systems). Nadelmann, 18 Inter-Am L Rev at 74 (cited in note 2).
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ures for the production of evidence. 146 The iU.N. Convention implicitly
adopts the multilateral approach by authorizing the use of Article 7 proce-
dures as a universal Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty ("MLAT") for cov-
ered offenses. 147
The U.N. Convention extensively reforms the existing system for ac-
quisition of evidence in foreign jurisdictions. 148 Article 7 creates a gen-
eral treaty obligation to provide "the widest measure of mutual legal
assistance [to other party states] in investigations, prosecutions and judi-
cial proceedings in relation to [money laundering]." 149 Such assistance
includes taking evidence, serving documents, executing searches and
seizures, examining objects and sites, providing financial and business
records, and identifying and tracing proceeds and instrumentalities of
crime. 150 It expressly provides that "a party shall not decline to render
mutual legal assistance ... on the ground of bank secrecy." 151 This con-
vention operates to amend existing MLATs to include the offense of
money laundering. 152 As between states which are not party to any ex-
isting bilateral or multilateral treaties on mutual legal assistance, the con-
vention specifies the procedures for making and executing such
requests.1 53
All proposals which address the subject seem to agree that each state
must designate a single authority with the responsibility for coordinating
requests for mutual legal assistance.154 These authorities should be the
exclusive means for exchange of information;1 55 however, international
proposals do not suggest with which branch of government this authority
should be affiliated. This authority must have diplomatic sensitivity in
order to recognize which requests are in compliance with the treaty.
1 56 It
146. Task Force Report at Part I1(D) Recs 34, 37 (cited in note 1).
147. UN Convention at Art 7(7)-19) (cited in note 9).
148. Treaty provisions providing for regional assistance in acquiring admissible evidence abroad
have been attempted before in Europe. Stewart, 18 Denver J Intl L & Policy at 398 (cited in note 8).
In addition, the Council of Europe has considered extending the "mutual assistance machinery" of its
Convention on Insider Trading to deal with money laundering matters. Untitled, Financial Times 3
(September 14, 1989) (NEXIS, Intl file).
149. UN Convention at Art 7(1) (cited in note 9).
150. Id at Art 7(2). Compare Task Force Report at Part Il(D) Rec 37 (cited in note 1).
151. UN Convention at Art 7(5) (cited in note 9).
152. Stewart, 18 Denver J Intl L & Policy at 399 (interpreting the UN Convention at Arts 7(1),
7(6) and 7(7)) (cited in note 8).
153. UN Convention at Art 7(7)-(19) (cited in note 9).
154. Id at Art 7(8); Council of Europe Convention at Art 23 (cited in note 9). See also Task
Force Report at Part Ill (D) Rec 32 (cited in note 1).
155. A single authority can expedite the execution of requests and would simplify the jobs of
overtaxed prosecutors who do not have time to familiarize themselves with foreign law. This device
would also save defendants the attorneys' fees associated with letters rogatory.
156. In the United Kingdom, an application for legal assistance from a foreign state must be
approved by the Secretary of State before it is presented to the courts. Critics there find it extraordi.
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must also determine when the outflow of requests has a deleterious effect
on established relationships.15 7 Moreover, it must have the executive au-
thority and legal acumen necessary to inform prosecutors of more effec-
tive and less abrasive techniques for gathering evidence. 5s A foreign
evidence officer also must have the political accountability to certify that
the requested evidence will be confidential 59 and will be used only for the
purpose designated by the requesting party. 16° At the same time, this
foreign evidence coordinator must possess the judicial impartiality neces-
sary to recognize both frivolous requests and potential violations of fun-
damental rights.' 61 Therefore, the establishment of a designated central
authority in each state is likely to be the most difficult hurdle in imple-
menting a European mutual legal assistance treaty.
D. Forfeiture
To penalize the offender and to make money laundering prosecution
pay for itself, party states must enact legislation providing for the forfei-
ture (freezing, seizure and confiscation) of the property and proceeds used
in or derived from covered offenses. All of the European proposals either
expressly or implicitly support the use of forfeiture as an enforcement
mechanism.' 62 The U.N. Convention and the Council of Europe Con-
vention go further and actually provide the legal basis for execution of
international forfeiture requests.' 63
The scope of confiscation provisions varies among the European pro-
posals. The U.N. Convention provides for confiscation up to the as-
sessed value of the intermingled proceeds.' 64 More expansive provisions
nary that such vital protection is limited purely to executive discretion. Elvidge and Henbrey, Bill
Offers Britain's Co-operation Too Freely at 21 (cited in note 113).
157. Nadelmann, 18 Inter-Am L Rev at 55 (cited in note 2).
158. Id.
159. UN Convention at Art 7(14) (cited in note 9). Prosecutors are reluctant to supply evidence
in support of a request under an MLAT because they fear that the information would be released due
to "corruption, carelessness, or legal process." Nadelmann, 18 Inter-Am L Rev at 56 note 66 (cited in
note 2).
160. UN Convention at Art 7(13)(14) (cited in note 9). The fear is that the requested nation will
initiate a rival prosecution of its own.
161. The U.S. defense bar is concerned that constitutional and human rights will be violated
unless defendants are given equal access to this discovery clearinghouse. Excluded from existing
MLATs, defendants have been forced to resort to letters rogatory "--essentially toothless requests-
in place of subpoenas for exculpatory evidence." Strasser, Crime Has No Borders at 40 (cited in note
16).
162. Basle Statement, Part IV (cited in note 9); Task Force Report at Part Ill(B) Rec 8 (cited in
note 1); UN Convention at Art 5 (cited in note 9); Council of Europe Convention at Art 2 (cited in
note 9).
163. UN Convention at Art 5 (cited in note 9); Council of Europe Convention at Art 2 (cited in
note 9).
164. UN Convention at Art 5(6)(b) (cited in note 9).
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in existing legislation have raised human rights and constitutional is-
sues.1 65 Recognizing the potential for abuse, the Council of Europe Con-
vention provides that each state must create effective legal remedies for
affected individuals in order to preserve their rights. 166 Likewise, the
Council of Europe and U.N. conventions seek to preserve the rights
which bona fide third parties may have in such situations. 167 However,
none of the European proposals exempts living and legal expenses while
the defendant is on trial. 168
Both the Council of Europe Convention and the U.N. Convention
emphasize the importance of international cooperation in forfeiture pro-
ceedings. They require a party state, upon request of another party state,
to assist in freezing or seizing illicit proceeds for the purposes of eventual
confiscation. 169 More importantly, both conventions establish proce-
dures by which one party may ask another to assist it by forfeiting pro-
ceeds located in the requested party's territory.170 The distinguishing
features of the Council of Europe Convention are (1) the designation of a
central authority responsible for sending and answering requests; 171 and
(2) the provision that the requested party shall be bound by the findings
of fact stated in the conviction or judicial decision of the requesting
165. Courts in the United Kingdom can confiscate proceeds derived from trafficking. The courts
also may assume, "unless the contrary is shown, that all the trafficker's current property, and every-
thing that he has held during the previous six years, is the proceeds of drug trafficking." Secrecy Issues
Slow Approval of Global Accords, Money Laundering Alert 7 (December 1989). Under U.S. law, if an
account is used to launder any amount of money, "everything passing through it is subject to
seizure." Strasser, Crime Has No Borders at 41 (cited in note 16). The Task Force Report recom-
mends the confiscation of laundered property, or alternatively, "property of corresponding value."
Task Force Report at Part Il(B) Rec 8 (cited in note 1). The forfeiture provision of the U.N. Conven-
tion would have all parties to the treaty allow confiscation of drug proceeds or substitute assets. U.N.
Convention at Art 5(l)(a) (cited in note 9). These broad confiscation provisions may violate the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights (right to property). Protocol to the Con-
vention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 UNTS 262 (signed March 20, 1952; in
force May 18, 1954). They also could eviscerate a money laundering defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel. U.N. Treaty on Dnigs Worries the Defense Bar, Natl L 3 5, 27 (September 25,
1989) (hypothesizing that a lawyer's fees, paid from non-tainted funds, conceivably could be subject to
forfeiture by a foreign power as a substitute for other drug-related assets).
166. Council of Europe Convention at Art 5 (cited in note 9).
167. UN Convention at Art 5(8) (cited in note 9); Council of Europe Convention at Arts 21-22
(cited in note 9). It is not clear whether these provisions would suffice to protect a defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel.
168. The law in New South Wales is unique in that it allows for "reasonable living and legal
expenses to be excluded from the scope of a restraining order." Fisse, &ance, England Press Money
Laundering Initiatives; Australia Begins Implementation of Cash Transaction Reporting Law, Money Laun-
dering Alert at 7 (cited in note 75).
169. UN Convention at Art 5(4) (cited in note 9). Council of Europe Convention at Art 7 (cited
in note 9).
170. UN Convention at Art 5(4) (cited in note 9). Council of Europe Convention at Arts 23-35
(cited in note 9).
171. Council of Europe Convention at Art 23 (cited in note 9).
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party. 172 The U.N. Convention makes no reference to a central authority
and allows for the initiation of in rem proceedings in the requested state
on the basis of evidence provided by the requesting state. 73 There also
are discrepancies between the two conventions as to when the proceeds
should be subject to seizure. 174
The appropriate disposition of the confiscated proceeds is also the
subject of much uncertainty. The U.N. Convention contemplates that
the parties may enter into agreements on a regular or case-by-case basis
providing either to share the confiscated proceeds between them175 or to
contribute the proceeds to inter-governmental bodies specializing in the
fight against illicit drug trafficking. 76 The Council of Europe Conven-
tion leaves the matter of disposition totally to the discretion of the re-
quested state.' 77
V. CONCLUSION
It is absolutely critical to compare and reconcile the five European
proposals for combatting money laundering before turning them over to
the national legislatures for implementation. The unaddressed issues and
fundamental differences revealed in this comparative study have the po-
tential to undermine everything that these plans individually seek to
achieve.
States must never lose sight of the fact that only a single, comprehen-
sive and coordinated plan can effectively exterminate the illicit laundering
of money. Inconsistencies in the laws of different states make the eradica-
tion of money laundering impossible. Criminal elements will be quick to
172. Id at Art 14.
173. UN Convention at Art 5(3)-(4)(a)(i) (cited in note 9).
174. Timing may be critical. Any delay will give the suspect an opportunity to conceal the loca-
tion of the illicit funds. Compare UN Convention at Art 5(4)(b) (cited in note 9) (freeze on request);
Council of Europe Convention at Art 11(1) (cited in note 9) (freeze after requesting party has insti-
tuted criminal proceedings). New South Wales law allows the Drug Crime Commission to apply for a
restraining order as soon as they "reasonably suspect" a person of drug trafficking. Fisse, France,
England Press Money Laundering Initiatives; Australia Begins Implementation of Cash Transaction Reporting
Law, Money Laundering Alert at 7 (cited in note 75). Swiss bank officials shocked the financial
community when they froze the assets of the Marcos family even before the Philippine government
requested them to do so. William W. Park, Legal Policy Conflicts in International Banking, 50 Ohio St L
J 1067, 1102 (1989).
175. UN Convention at Art 5(5)(b)(ii) (cited in note 9). The Cartagena Declaration, an agree-
ment signed by Columbia, Bolivia, Peru and the United States to curtail money laundering, stipulates
that the countries which cooperate to discover the assets of international drug traffickers may share
those assets. Juan Carlos Parmenion, United States: World Cooperation Key to Anti-Drug Campaign,
Inter Press Service (February 15, 1991) (NEXIS, Intl file). See also Task Force Report at Part II(D)
Rec 39 (cited in note 1).
176. UN Convention at Art 5(5)(b)(i) (cited in note 9).
177. Council of Europe Convention at Art 15 (cited in note 9).
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recognize the opportunities presented by even subtle distinctions and will
not hesitate to exploit them. Driven by their own economic self-interest,
some nations may ignore these proposals or seek to adopt only their weak-
est provisions. Ironically, they will be able to do so with impunity by
making reference to particular international agreements and the issues
they left unresolved.
Multinational organizations have developed five proposals that col-
lectively represent a principled and viable approach for solving the
world's money laundering problem. Now these proposals must be com-
pleted, reconciled, and finally transformed into a single coordinated
blueprint from which there can be no deviation. Only after the imple-
mentation of a uniform system among states can Europe expect to stave
off the rising tide of money laundering that is otherwise inevitable.
Jeffrey Lowell Quillen
